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Abstract. Digital watermarking studies have always been driven by the
improvement of robustness. Most of articles of this field deal with this cri-
terion, presenting more and more impressive experimental assessments.
Some key events in this quest are the use of spread spectrum, the in-
vention of resynchronization schemes, the discovery of side information
channel, and the formulation of the opponent actions as a game.
On the contrary, security received little attention in the watermarking
community. This paper presents a comprehensive overview of this recent
topic. We list the typical applications which requires a secure water-
marking technique. For each context, a threat analysis is purposed. This
presentation allows us to illustrate all the certainties the community has
on the subject, browsing all key papers. The end of the paper is devoted
to what remains not clear, intuitions and future studies.
1 Introduction
Watermarking is the art of hiding metadata in content in a robust manner. ‘Hid-
ing’ has unfortunately many meanings. Some understand that the embedding of
metadata doesn’t cause any perceptual distortion. Watermarking is then the art
of creating a communication channel inside a piece of content without spoiling
its entertainment. Others cast a security requirement in the word ‘hiding’. This
surprisingly happened at the very beginning of the digital watermarking story.
1.1 Historical point of view
This very early relationship between security and watermarking might be ex-
plained from a historical perspective. In the analog age, content was protected
by copyright laws included in intellectual property treaties dating back from the
50’s [1]. There was a balance between conflicting issues like the copyright holders
interests and the user-friendly usage of content. The digital age and the merging
of formats from the entertainment and computer industries broke this balance
in the 90’s, spoiling copyright holders. Technical barriers have been created to
enforce the copyright laws1. As cryptography leaves insecure protected content
? This work is partially funded by the national ACI project FABRIANO.
1 Technical barriers have been existing for a longer time, but the 90’s have seen the
generalization of their use, especially with DRM (Digital Right Management).
2once decrypted by users, a recent technology named digital watermarking was
perceived as the last line of defense. It allows to firmly bound content with meta-
data such as the copyright holder identity (copyright protection [2]) or the copy
status (copy protection [3]). At that time, the na¨ıve rationale was: “If you can’t
see it, and if it is not removed by common processing, then it must be secure”.
Unfortunately, digital watermarking was too young a science to support such
an adventurous assertion. The technique was even lacking sufficient robustness
to fulfill the requirements of these first applications. Defeats happened very
soon [4], so that the watermarking community envisaged applications where
security is not an issue (e.g. content enhancement). On the front of copyright
and copy protection, new laws has been promoted in the 2000’s forbidding the
circumvention of DRM system [1]. In a way, this new legal framework patches
the security flaws of technical barriers, including digital watermarking. There
are now three walls of defense: new laws protect the technical barriers which
protect the enforcement of old copyright law which protect content’s use and
exploitation. On the other hand, absolute security does not exist (not even in
cryptography) and a high security level has a cost which nobody wants to pay for
(copyright holders, device manufacturers, users?). The goal of the entertainment
industry is not to erase piracy but to maximize their incomes. To this end, weak
security is better than no security [5], and a slightly secure but cheap protection
system is enough to “keep honest people honest”.
This historical point of view shows that security of digital watermarking has
clearly lost interest in real life applications. However, it becomes a hot issue in
the watermarking community [6, 7]. We believe that researchers have stretched
the limit of robustness to almost its maximum so that new attacks pertain
more to security than classical robustness. Because a secure but non robust
watermarking technique would be useless, robustness is the weakest link and it
was the priority to be fixed. Huge improvements have been done in this field, and
security now appears as the next issue on the list. Even if it is less important for
real applications, it is also theoretically challenging because very few certainties
are known about watermarking security.
1.2 Elements to define security
Does a short and concise definition of watermarking security exist? This question
stems from two facts: watermarking security has different implications according
the targeted application, and security is too close to robustness to be clearly dis-
tinguished [8]. Note that, so far, we have discussed about security understanding
it as security of robust watermarking. It is time now to broaden our scope.
In copy protection, copyright protection and fingerprinting, we need to assess
that dishonest users cannot remove the watermark signal. However, note that in
copy protection, a pirate should not be able to change content status to a less
restrictive one (e.g., from ‘Copy Never’ to ‘Copy Once’)[3]. In fingerprint, a col-
lusion (group of pirates) should not frame an innocent user, i.e. they should not
change their hidden message into the identifier of an honest user [9]. In copyright
protection, an author should not copy and paste his watermark (possibly issued
3by a trusted third party) in content he didn’t create [10]. In authentication, the
goal of the pirate is not to remove the authenticating watermark signal but to
sign content in place of the secret key holder [11]. In steganography2, the pirate
does not remove watermark signal but detects the presence of hidden data, and
the watermarking technique used for it [12].
This suggests criteria to make a clear cut between robustness and security:
Intention. In security, there obviously exists a pirate. In robustness, a clas-
sical content processing made without any malicious intention, might delude the
watermark decoder.
General. Robustness usually considers classical content processing. In secu-
rity, pirates apply malicious attacks dedicated to one watermarking technique.
Removal. In robustness, the effect of the attack is to mure the watermarking
decoder. The attack succeeds in removing enough watermarking energy or it has
desynchronized the embedder and the decoder. In security, we have seen that
pirates’ goals are different according to the targeted application.
Number of steps. In robustness, the pirate applies a processing to the
watermarked piece of content. This is a single step process. In security, the pirate
observes several watermarked pieces of content. He gains from these observations
some information about the watermarking technique and the secret key in use.
Then, with this ‘stolen’ knowledge, he attacks protected content. This is a two-
step process. Some say the pirate is not fair, in the sense that he is not contented
with the official instruction (e.g. the watermarking technique according to the
Kerckhoffs’ principle), but he tries to access all the information which may be
of any help for his goal (e.g. the secret key) [13, Sect. 2].
Probability of success. In robustness, an attack is usually not always
successful, but it leads to a given Bit Error Rate (decoding) or probability of a
miss (detection). In security, a successful hack is almost granted when the pirate
has an accurate estimation of the secret key (if this is his goal).
However, T. Kalker formulated very elegant definitions of robustness and
security [14, Sect. 2]. These may not encompass all cases, but they are the only
concise attempts we are aware of. “Robust watermarking is a mechanism to
create a communication channel that is multiplexed into original content [...]. It
is required that, firstly, the perceptual degradation of the marked content [...] is
minimal and, secondly, that the capacity of the watermark channel degrades as
a smooth function of the degradation of the marked content. [...]. Watermarking
security refers to the inability by unauthorized users to have access to the raw
watermarking channel. [...] to remove, detect and estimate, write or modify the
raw watermarking bits.”
2 Theories of watermarking security
This section deals with the recent attempts to fund a theory of watermark secu-
rity. What is the role of this theory? Before its existence, the security assessment
2 We only consider passive steganography in this paper.
4of a watermarking technique was fuzzy in the sense that the analysts had to think
about an attack and to see how dangerous it was. In other words, the security
assessment was clearly dependent on the cleverness of the analysts. Maybe, later
on, one will discover a more powerful attack which will lower the security level
of the watermarking technique. In a way, the role of a watermarking security
theory is to assess the security level once for all.
2.1 Steganography
Steganography was the first field in data hiding to benefit from a theory of
security. This happens very early in 1998-99 compared to robust watermarking.
The first attempt was made by C. Cachin and it is the most famous theory
of steganography security [15]. In steganography, the attacker’s goal is to detect
a hidden communication in content Z that Alice sends to Bob. This job is a
hypothesis test: either the piece of content is a stego-content (H1 : Z = Y ),
either it is a natural image (H0 : Z = X). Performances of the test are measured
by the probability of false alarm Pfa (i.e. probability of wrongly accusing Alice)
and the power of the test Pp (i.e. probability of rightly accusing Alice). An
efficient test yields Pp ∼ 1 for Pfa ∼ 0. However, whatever the structure of the
test, its performances are limited by the discrimination between the statistics of
Y and of X. This is stated by the data processing theorem [16, Th. 4.4.1]:
DKL(pX , pY ) ≥ DKL(Pfa, Pp) ≥ 0 (1)
where DKL(., .) is the Kullback-Leibler distance (aka discrimination or relative
entropy). For instance, if Alice succeeds to produce stego-content Y statistically
similar to original content X (i.e. pdf pX and pY are identical almost everywhere
but possibly on sets of zero pX -probability), then DKL(pX , pY ) = 0, which
implies Pfa = Pp. The test is null because it is equivalent of a random decision
discarding the observation for flipping a coin to take the decision. If the coin is
not biased, this yields Pfa = Pp = 0.5. C. Cachin argues that if Alice is able to
show that DKL(pX , pY ) < ², then she limits the performances of the attacker,
whatever his test. For ² = 0, we have unconditional security. This rationale was
applied to build stego-systems with ² as small as possible in papers [17, 18].
The second attempt was made by T. Mittelholzer and it surprisingly re-
mains unknown [19]. The security is related to the amount of information about
the stego-message M that leaks from the stego-content Y when ignoring the
secret key. This amount is measured by the mutual information I(M ;Y ). Per-
fect steganography (or unconditional security) is achieved when I(M ;Y ) = 0.
Examples of such schemes are given in [19, Sect. 3].
2.2 Robust Watermarking
The theory of robust watermarking security, when successfully applied, gives a
lower bound on the secret key estimation accuracy depending on the figure of
observed contents. Assume that the pirate knows the watermarking technique
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that pirates observing watermarked content can derive some knowledge about
the secret key. In other words, information about secret parameters leaks from
one watermarked content. This amount of leakage is certainly very small. Yet,
if pirates observe many pieces of content watermarked with the same key, each
of them leaking some information, then their knowledge increase. It reaches a
point where an accurate estimation of the secret key allows powerful attacks.
This magnitude of order defines in a way the security level of the watermark-
ing technique as a number of contents: if one watermarks with the same secret
key more pieces of content than allowed by the security level, then a pirate can
disclose this later one. As the pirate cannot extract more information about the
secret than foreseen by the theory, this guarantees a lower bound.
These recent attempts setting a theoretical framework for watermarking se-
curity analysis are indeed the adaptation of the fundamental work of C.E. Shan-
non, which is considered as the theoretical basis of cryptanalysis [20]. There is
nothing new here except the adaptation. Ideas of this adaptation work firstly
appeared in [21, Sect. 2.6], [22, Sect. 4.1.1]. The key idea of this theory is to
measure this amount of information leakage. Shannon mutual information [23,
Sect. 3][24, Sect. 3] or Fisher information matrix [23, Sect. 4] are tools used for
this purpose. We will not address the differences between this two tools (see [24,
Sect. 2]). There are pros and cons, and even other ways to measure information
(Kullback Leibler distance or Renyi information [25]), and also relations between
them [26]. What is of utmost importance is that the measurement tool provide
a physical interpretation.
The physical interpretation in the Shannon paradigm links the mutual in-
formation with the equivocation [20, Sect. 12]. This term is a synonym for the
uncertainty or ignorance the pirate has about the secret key. It is measured by
the entropy of secret key, regarding it as a random variable:
h(K|YNo) = h(K)− I(K;YNo). (2)
The watermarker has selected a technique and a secret key, the pirate knows
the technique but not the key K. Entropy h(K) measures the a priori equivo-
cation, which is the amount of uncertainty before the game starts. The water-
marker has produced No watermarked pieces of content YNo = {Y1, . . . ,YNo},
each of them leaking some information. Entropy h(K|YNo) is the a posteriori
equivocation, the amount of uncertainty when the game has started: The total
information leakage is I(K;YNo) ≥ 0. We see that the a posteriori equivocation
decreases thanks to the total leakage. A watermarking technique is perfectly se-
cure if I(K;YNo) = 0: The pirate will never improve his knowledge about K,
whatever the figure of produced watermarked pieces of content.
The physical interpretation provided by the Fisher information FIM(K,YNo)
is less theoretical. It is given by the Cramer-Rao Bound, which states that what-
ever the unbiased estimator Kˆ of the secret key, its accuracy is bounded by3:
σ2
Kˆ
≥ FIM(K,YNo)−1. (3)
3 For simplicity reason, we explain here the CRB in the scalar case.
6The smaller the leakage FIM(K,YNo) is, the less accurate is the estimator.
2.3 Contextual studies
C. Shannon gives a theory of encryption security where the attacker observes
cipher texts. This describes what might happen in military communication. How-
ever, in the 70’s, cryptography broadens its activities to different fields such as
the security of financial transactions. In these new applications, the attacker
might not only access cipher texts. At that time, Diffie and Hellman suggest to
encompass different contexts in the security level assessment [27, Sect. 2]. These
contexts are classified according to the type of observations.
The same terminology was applied in watermarking because this tool is used
in many different applications leading to different contexts of attack [22, Sect.
3.3]. All we have to do is to replace YNo by ONo , where O is an observation:
Watermarked Only Attack (O = Y), Known Original Attack (O = {Y,X}), Es-
timated Original Attack (O = {Y, Xˆ}), Known Message Attack (O = {Y,M}).
This list is absolutely not closed nor exhaustive. Some other ideas can be:
– Chosen Watermarked Attack: This is another name for the sensitivity attack.
The pirate has a sealed watermark detector. His goal is to disclose the secret
key inside by feeding it with chosen contents while noting the output. The
observations in this attack are pairs of content and detection output.
– Chosen Original Attack: The pirate has a sealed watermark embedder. His
goal is to disclose the secret key inside by feeding it with chosen original
contents and saving the watermarked version. The observations here are
pairs of original and watermarked content (with the hidden messages).
– Single Original, Multiple Watermarked Attack: This tackles the threat in
fingerprinting application: collusion. One original piece of content is water-
marked several times with different hidden messages. A collusion of c pirates
shares their version noticing differences. Observations are c-tuples water-
marked contents.
– Multiple Original, Multiple Watermarked Attack: This is the same idea, but
this time, there are No original pieces of content which have been water-
marked and distributed to the clients. Observations is a matrix of c × No
watermarked contents. Note that a column of this matrix yields a Known
Message Attack, and a line a Single Original, Multiple Watermarked Attack.
The security level assessment of a watermarking technique has to be done
context by context, decoupled from application considerations. Then, for a given
application, the watermark designer selects the most suitable technique depend-
ing on which contexts the threats in this scenario relate.
3 Practical tools
These theories do not say anything on the way how to extract and exploit the in-
formation leakage. Another crucial point is the complexity of such an algorithm.
7This notion was already present in [20, Sect. 21] and denoted as work. It might
be theoretically possible to extract enough information in order to estimate the
secret key, while, in practice, demanding too much computing power. Cryptog-
raphers distinguish unconditional security (it is proven that no information leaks
from the observations) and computational security (the best known algorithm
requires an unreasonable amount of computing power) [28, Sect. 1.13.3].
Whereas theory is just the adaptation of Shannon’s security model, practice
of watermarking security consists in inventing original and efficient algorithms.
Their cores are often known signal processing tools from fields which have a
priori nothing in common with watermarking. This extremely interesting part
of the job proves once again that watermarking is a multi-field science.
3.1 Steganalysis
The theory of C. Cachin basically says that an alarm should be raised when a
suspicious content does not comply with the statistical model of original images.
This raises at least three issues:
Feature extraction. First, images gather in the order of one million of pix-
els. If the random variable Y is an image, then its definition set Y is extremely
big, and indeed, too huge to lie a statistical model on top. Steganalysers usu-
ally extract a feature vector Y˜ from image Y . This reduces the definition space:
|Y˜| < |Y|. Yet, this also reduces the discrimination between stego and original
content: DKL(pH0(Y˜ ), pH1(Y˜ )) ≤ DKL(pX , pY ). One must take care of extract-
ing the most discriminative features. This strategy is certainly possible when
the stego technique is a priori known. However, it is far more difficult when the
steganalyser is universal (to spot stego-contents, whatever the stego-system).
The theory provides some clues. If extracted features are modeled as inde-
pendent under assumption H0, then pH0(Y˜ ) =
∏
i pH0(Y˜i), and [29, Sect. 2.1]:
DKL(pH1(Y˜ ), pH0(Y˜ )) = I(Y˜ ) +
∑
i
DKL(pH1(Y˜i), pH0(Y˜i)) (4)
where I(Y˜ ) = DKL(pH1(Y˜ ),
∏
i pH1(Y˜i)) measures the dependency between
the features, and the second term is the KL distance between the pdf of the
marginals. This decomposition seems to justify the use of features extracted
from wavelet coefficients such as i) prediction errors to measure the dependency
between these coefficients and ii) high order statistics (mean, variance, skewness,
kurtosis...) to measure the last summand [30, Sect. 2].
Classifier. Once the definition space is set, a second problem is the statistical
model. Such a model is required because theorems of hypothesis testing state
that optimal tests are based on a sufficient statistic T = pH1(Y˜ )/pH0(Y˜ ) [31,
Chap. 2]. A simple statistical model might be derived for a given stego-system.
Yet, this strategy is not possible for universal steganalysers. Usually, a SVM
8(Support Vector Machine) is trained on databases of features extracted from
stego-contents and original contents [30, Sect. 3]. The SVM learns a way to
distinguish the two cases, observing samples of Yˆ under both hypothesis H1 or
H0. In a way, it experimentally learns a statistical model for each hypothesis.
Conditioning. A third problem stems from the fact that Cachin theorem need
a model for pH0(Y˜ ). Yet, natural images are so diverse that pH0(Y˜ ) is a kind
of smooth and large function spreading all over the definition set Y˜. Assuming
a parametric model p(Y˜ |θ), we have pH0(Y˜ ) =
∫
p(Y˜ |θ)p(θ)dθ. Some universal
steganalysers, for instance, are confused with noisy original images or sharp
contour original images as this corresponds to unusual parameter θ.
However, for one particular image, the sufficient statistic of the stego-content
is usually higher than the one of the original image. In other words, if the ste-
ganalyser could observe the original content and then its stego version, it would
notice an increase of the sufficient statistic. Or, within this statistical model, if
the steganalyser knows θ, it could be based on more accurate statistics. This
gives birth to a very general idea [32, Sect. 3]: the suspicious image Z is slightly
transformed to yield an estimation θˆ. Features are extracted and used to build
the pdf pH0(X˜|θˆ). A mathematical model foresees pH1(Y˜ |θˆ), and thus the suffi-
cient statistic can be calculated T = pH1(Z˜|θˆ)/pH0(Z˜|θˆ). If the suspicious image
is a natural image, then T ∼ 1, otherwise T > 1. This leads to better steganal-
ysers even in the universal mode. This is not surprising as conditioning always
improves discrimination on average [16, Th. 4.3.6].
3.2 Watermarking
Here are some useful signal processing tools to hack watermarking schemes.
Maximum Likelihood Estimator. Let us consider the watermarking em-
bedder as a system to be identified. Hence, in the Known Message Attack, we
observe pairs of input (i.e. message m) and output (watermarked content y). In
other words, we have the framework of a input-output identification. If it possi-
ble to write the likelihood p(yNo ,mNo |K), the opponent can use the Maximum
Likelihood Estimator (MLE), which finds Kˆ maximizing the likelihood or nul-
lifying its derivative. The MLE is known to be unbiased and consistent, i.e. it
asymptotically achieves the CRB derived in 2.2. This has been applied to spread
spectrum scheme in [33, Sect. 1.1].
Expectation Maximization Algorithm. Unknown messages can be consid-
ered as hidden data. The MLE based on p(yNo ,mNo |K) is not practical in this
case. But, the EM algorithm approaches it by the iteration of a two-step process:
– Expectation. Having an estimation of the key Kˆ(i), we estimate the messages
mˆNo(i). This basically corresponds to the decoding algorithm, known by the
pirate according to Kerckhoff’s principle.
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secret key Kˆ(i+ 1). This step uses for instance the MLE seen above.
This has been applied to spread spectrum schemes in [33, Sect. 1.3].
Principal Component Analysis. Many watermark schemes uses projection
onto Nc orthonormal private vectors or carriers u` in order to increase the SNR
at the decoding side. In general, one can write: y = x+w, with x the host signal,
andw =
∑Nc
i=1 γiui. The coefficients γi carry the message to be hidden and tackle
the perceptual constraint. We asssume they are independent from x, i.i.d and
centered. It means that the watermark signal w lives in a small subspace whose
dimension is Nc, whereas x belongs to RNv . This leaves clues for the pirate as
the energy of the watermark is focused on a small subspace. For instance, if x is a
white noise, the covariance matrix of y is Ry = σ2xI+
∑Nc
i=1E{γ2i }uiuTi , whereas
Rx = σ2xI. This means that Rx has one eigenvalue σ2x with order Nv, whereas
Ry has one eigenvalue σ2x with order Nv−Nc, and Nc other eigenvalues equaling
σ2x + E{γ2i }. Moreover, these Nc biggest eigenvalues are related to eigenvectors
ui. Consequently, it is very easy for the pirate to estimate these private carriers:
i) estimate the covariance matrix Ry with Rˆy =
∑No
i=1 y(i)y(i)
T /No, ii) make an
eigen-decomposition of this matrix, iii) isolate the eigen-vectors corresponding
to the Nc biggest eigenvalues. Figure 1 illustrates this for toy examples. Ellipses
show that the watermarked signals are no more white signals.
This Principal Component Analysis has been applied to spread spectrum
based schemes in [33, Sect. 1.3] and also in [34, Sect. V.C].
Independent Component Analysis. In the case where E{γ2i } = cst, then
Ry has one eigenvalue σ2x + E{γ2i } with associated subspace of dimension Nc.
When successful, the PCA reveals this subspace and gives a basis, which is not
the one used by the embedder: {u1, . . . ,uNc}. The pirate can focus his attack
noise on this subspace, or remove the watermark signal nullifying the projection
of y onto this subspace. Yet, he cannot have a read and write access on the
watermarking channel.
If symbols γi are statistically independent, an Independent Component Anal-
ysis rotates the PCA basis until the estimated symbols ‘look like’ independent.
When successful, the ICA yields estimated carriers which correspond to the real
basis up to permutation pi(.) and change of sign: uˆi = ±upi(i). This ambiguity
prevents the pirate to embed/decode messages, but he can check if two water-
marked contents have the same hidden message or he can flip bits of hidden
messages. This was applied to spread spectrum based schemes in [33, Sect. 1.3].
Clustering. The authors of [34] have tested clustering tools to break a video
watermarking technique. This technique randomly embeds one of n watermark
signals in one video frame. An average attack does not work as it only esti-
mates a mixture of these n signals. However, if a spatial filter succeeds to isolate
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Fig. 1. A collection of watermarked signals (Nv = 2,Nc = 1) with the Spread Spectrum
technique (left) and the Spread Transform Scalar Costa Scheme (right). Red circles
(green crosses) represent signals hiding symbol ‘0’ (resp., ‘1’). The grey area (white
area) is the decoding region associated to symbol ‘0’ (resp. ‘1’). Matlab source code
available at www.irisa.fr/temics/Equipe/Furon/iwdw05.m
enough watermark energy, the pirate obtains noisy estimations of the n water-
mark signals. His goal is now to split this set of estimations in n clusters of
estimations corresponding to one watermark signal, and whose centroids would
be good estimates of the n watermark signals. This is a typical task for the
k-means algorithm (see [34, Sect. IV.D]).
Vector Quantization. A closely related tool is the vector quantization, which
is used for replacement attack. The pirate as a database of signal blocks and
he wishes to replace a block in a watermarked content by a similar block of the
database. The word similar is here important. The vector quantization is used
to find in the database the most similar ‘codeword’ (i.e., block), in the sense
of the euclidian distance. This tools is used for attacking video watermarking
techniques [34, Sect. IV.D] or block based authentication schemes [35].
4 Applications
This section gives examples of application where the lack of watermarking secu-
rity is a threat. We first analyze what the pirate can do with one watermarked
content, and then, we see applications where many contents are watermarked.
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4.1 Watermarking one piece of content
Any application at least discloses one watermarked piece of content.
Robustness. The common threat comes from the robustness, except for the
scenarios listed below. We especially think here of malicious attack such as the
Worst Case Attack or Optimal Attack detailed in recent literature about wa-
termarking robustness [36–38]. Another weakness stems from classical synchro-
nization tricks used in watermarking: templates [39] or geometrically redundant
watermarking signals [40, Sect. 6.2] are easy to defeat. The block replacement at-
tack is also a threat: the database is constituted from blocks of non-watermarked
contents, or even blocks from the watermarked piece of content [34].
Deadlock attack and copy-paste attack. The deadlock attack concerns
copyright protection and illustrates the impossibility to prevent somebody to
watermark content with his own technique and key (by embedding a watermark
signal or by creating a fake original) [41]. This ruins the identification of the
owner because two watermarking channels interfere in the same piece of content.
Multiple problems in the field of copyright protection and authentication
stems from the copy attack, where the attacker first copies a watermark and
then pastes it in a different piece of content [10].
These two last attacks pertain to the protocol layer, in the sense that it
questions the link between the presence (or absence) of watermark and the sig-
nification at the application layer. We believe that these attacks stem from a
misunderstanding of the watermark designers about the targeted application.
In copyright protection, the presence of a watermark has no legal value. The
only receivable proof is the belonging of the content to the database of a trusted
third party (i.e., an author society). The authors must register their works in
this database in order to be protected. It is absolutely useless, from a legal point
of view, for the authors to watermark their works on their own. If watermarking
is used in copyright protection, it will be embedded by the trusted third party
during the registration process.
However, suppose this resort to a trusted third party is not possible (e.g., it
is too expensive for the author). At least, the choice of the watermarking tech-
nique shall not be given to the author, but somehow imposed by a standard.
This standard should select a non-invertible watermarking technique to avoid
the deadlock attack. For instance, the secret key should depend on a hash of
the original image to prevent the forgery of fake original. Note that this also
prevents the copy-paste attack. In the same way, the copy attack is now a non-
sense in authentication application. It is true that the very first watermarking
authentication schemes were using a constant watermark. But, nowadays, it is
well established that the watermark must depend on the original content like a
digital signature in cryptography.
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4.2 Watermarking several pieces of content
Some application discloses several watermarked pieces of content using the same
key. This is also the case of video watermarking as the embedder watermarks
consecutive blocks of video, whence several pieces.
Copy protection. In copy protection, the set of hidden messages is very small
(typically ‘Copy Never’, ‘Copy Once’, and ‘Copy no more’). Moreover, the pirate
knows the status of the content. A Known Message Attack is then a real threat.
Another point is that watermark decoders are released in an hostile envi-
ronment. For instance, they are embedded in consumer electronic devices such
as DVD recorders. Pirates can then test watermark decoding as many times as
they wish. They do not do this to remove the watermark content by content,
but in order to disclose the secret key of the detector [42, 43].
Authentication. The assessment of the authentication schemes is sometimes
na¨ıve: researchers check that even slight modification of the signed image is
indeed detectable. However, in an authentication scenario, it is likely that many
images have to be signed. The threat is that a pirate can sign an image without
knowing the secret key: he replaces every block of this image by blocks from
already signed images. This is indeed a Vector Quantization attack. Counter
attacks exist which render the probability of a successful hack extremely small
unless the codebooks of replacement blocks are extremely huge [44].
Fingerprinting. The typical assessment of fingerprinting schemes is that a
collusion of pirates cannot frame an innocent user and that the detector can
trace at least one pirate. However, a more complex scenario is the following
one: video fingerprinting. In this framework, there are many original contents
fingerprinted in different versions, because a watermarking technique embeds
hidden messages in a video block by block. For a given user, all these blocks are
watermarked with the same secret key and the same hidden message (i.e., the
user’s codeword). This is a Constant Message Attack (or a Multiple Original,
Multiple Watermarked Attack), which is very closed to a Known Message Attack.
As watermarking techniques are very weak against it [24, Sect. 4.1],[23, Sect. 4.3],
it seems for the moment that secure video fingerprinting is not possible.
5 Conclusion: What we do not know yet
Robust Watermarking. From a theoretical point of view, the security lev-
els of classical schemes such as spread spectrum and QIM have been well es-
tablished [45]. However, trellis coding schemes [46] or orthogonal dirty paper
codes [47] have not been studied yet. From a practical point of view, algorithms
to disclose secret dithering in QIM scheme have not been proposed yet. This
might be a complex task especially with a QIM based on VQ. Watermarking
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techniques usually used an Error Correction Code, which brings redundancy
and thus a security flaw. But, no study has been done on this topic.
Steganalysis. Good steganalyzers appeared recently, but they have been
tested on simple stego-systems (LSB or +1/-1). No one knows how do they
perform against more advanced stego-systems based on QIM.
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